Abstract: In this paper, we focus on the strategic role of corporate venture financing by a corporation in securing own demand. When the headquarter finances the venture through the corporate venture capitalist, he commits himself to compensate the venture for the effort to increase the complementarity between its product and the headquarter's product. The headquarter therefore faces the following tradeoff: either be more aggressive ex post in the product market (by undercutting more its rivals) or use corporate venture financing to affect the venture's product innovation outcome to weaken ex post competition with substitute products. This allows him to secure demand for his own product.
Introduction
Entrepreneurs often seek venture capitalists to¯nance their start-up¯rms.
Most of them often sign an initial¯nancing contract with an independent venture capitalist (IVC), i.e. a venture capitalist which has no a±liation with an established corporate group. At the intermediate stage, a corporate venture capitalist (CVC), i.e. a venture capitalist with the backing of a corporate group (hereafter in the paper, we will call it the headquarter (HQ)) might express its interests to participate in the venture.
The evidence showing that large corporations indeed often establish corporate venture funds is quite abundant. For instance, Gompers and Lerner (1998) show that during the late 1960s and early 1970s, more than 25% of the Fortune 500¯rms established corporate venture funds. It is estimated that corporate investors accounted for 30% of the commitments to new funds in 1997. In Europe (EVCA (2001)), about 11% of the funds raised in 2000 came from corporate investors.
There are several reasons underlying the use of corporate venture¯nanc-ing (see Gompers and Lerner (1998) ). One reason is that it enhances°ex-ibility for the HQ, because it allows the HQ to focus on the core business rather than on other secondary issues (it allows to outsource R&D activities).
It also allows the HQ to respond more rapidly to investment opportunities.
The use of such a¯nancing scheme may also enhance trust from the venture, because it signals that the HQ will not steal the novel idea of the venture. Finally, there is also a strategic reason behind it. Corporate venture¯nancing can be used as a strategic vehicle to generate its own demand. Sometimes at a later stage the HQ may even incorporate the venture into its business portfolio. In this paper, we focus our analysis on this last motive. The decision to use corporate venture¯nancing allows the HQ to in°u-ence the degree of complementarity between its own product (used by the venture as an input) and the¯nal product of the venture. This allows the HQ to \steal" (or to \secure") demand from other companies when the HQ's product can be substituted with other inputs. An example could be the choice between a specialized and a standardized processor as a necessary input for an electronic¯nal good (produced by the innovative venture). The present paper builds upon this kind of reasoning and provides a formal model to explain it.
To get a clearer idea about this present paper, let us consider the case of a new venture which requires a processor as an input to produce an electronic¯nal good. The venture has a choice of either using a specialized or a standardized processor. Even if the price of a specialized processor is higher than the price of a standardized one, utilizing the former may enable the venture to produce the¯nal good at lower marginal costs than using the latter one. We assume that in order to enable this reduction in marginal costs, the venture has to adapt his product to the HQ's one. We can think of it as e®ort that the venture has to exert in order to realize the complementary bene¯ts from using the specialized processor. Thus, this creates a trade-o® as to which type of processor to be utilized. If the total costs of obtaining the specialized processor and exerting e®ort are lower than the bene¯ts accrued in term of reduction in marginal costs, then the venture will utilize the specialized processor.
Suppose that the specialized processor is produced by the HQ, which is an upstream monopolist, and that the standardized processor is produced by many¯rms in a competitive upstream market. Thus, the standardized processor will be sold at marginal costs. Depending on the relative magnitude of the upstram marginal costs and the downstream marginal costs of using a certain kind of input, the HQ may or may not be able to do a price-undercutting strategy in order to attract demand for the specialized processor. The corporate venture¯nancing enhances the°exibility of the price-undercutting strategy. Consequently, the HQ will not have to undercut the competitors' price so much. At the extreme case, in which the HQ is not able to do a price-undercutting strategy, i.e. because its marginal costs of producing the specialized input are prohibitively high, the corporate venturē nancing enables the HQ to in°uence the degree of complementarity between its own product and the venture's one in its own favor and in this way to \steal" demand from the competitors. Thus, it secures demand for the HQ.
In this paper, we also show that in the absence of corporate venture¯-4 nancing there can be a hold-up problem. The venture will be reluctant to exert e®ort in order to realize the complementary bene¯ts. This is because the venture anticipates that the HQ will expropriate these bene¯ts, i.e. by taking them into account in the determination of the specialized processor price. This, of course, reduces the°exibility of the price-undercutting strategy. To resolve this hold-up problem, the HQ can provide¯nancing to the venture through its intermediary, i.e. the corporate venture fund. Once a¯-nancing is provided, the corporate venture capitalist can impose the optimal degree of complementarity that has to be carried out by the venture and the compensation of the entrepreneur can be set in the agreement.
There are some related papers investigating the role of corporate venturē nancing, however they emphasize di®erent aspects of corporate venture¯-nancing from what we are focusing here, i.e. on the securing-demand motive. Bharat and Galetovic (2000) analyses the choice of¯nancing of a new venture. It could be¯nanced by a venture capitalist or by a corporation directly.
Their focus is on the link between the strength of property rights and the choice of¯nancing. They show that when property rights are strong, the venture is funded by the venture capitalist, however when property rights are weak, the venture may be¯nanced by the corporation, or the venture capitalist, or remains unfunded. Similar issues have been raised by Aghion and Tirole (1994) and Ambec and Poitevin (1999) for the HQ's decision whether or not to do R&D in-house or outside the organization. Similar to our paper, Hellmann (2001) analyzes the strategic role of venture investing. However, his focus is di®erent from ours. He focuses on the venture's choice of¯nancing, i.e. either a corporate venture¯nancing or an independent venture¯nancing. Thus, in his paper, the entrepreneur is an active player deciding which venture capitalist to sign a contract with. It therefore provides a rationale for the use of corporate venture¯nancing in early stages. The use of corporate venture capital mitigates the potential hold-up problem at the R&D stage. In contrast, our paper takes another perspective. First, it provides a rationale for later-stage¯nancing. And second, it focuses on the HQ's active role in utilizing corporate venture¯nancing strategically as a commitment to compensate the entrepreneur for potential opportunistic bahavior in the product market. It therefore helps to avoid a potential ex post hold-up problem in the product market (and not a hold-up problem in the R&D stage). We argue that centering the focus on the HQ enables us to pin point the strategic role of corporate venture¯nancing in securing demand for the HQ and show that this depends on the existence of substitute inputs for the venture.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our benchmark model, i.e. the model with no corporate venture¯nancing. Section 3 covers the model with corporate venture¯nancing. In this Section, we also draw some testable empirical implications. Section 4 discusses the case of securing demand in more detail. Section 5 wrap up the results. A general discussion on how such corporate venture¯nancing is implemented in practice (with additional examples) is done in Section 6. Section 7 covers some interesting extensions. Finally, Section 8 concludes. We consider a case in which there is an entrepreneur (managing a venture) that after having innovated, manufactures a¯nal good and sell it in a new market. Thus, upon success the venture will be a monopolist. Without loss of generality, we normalize the venture's exerted e®ort in innovation to zero.
The wealthless entrepreneur gets the initial (¯rst-round)¯nancing from an independent venture capitalist (IVC). We assume that the IVC faces competition from other venture capitalists and is therefore put at its reservation value. Having a¯nancing from the IVC implies that the venture has full°e xibility on the action that the venture takes. The amount of investment needed is denoted by I > 0.
The life span of the venture can be divided into two phases, in which thē rst phase is the R&D phase. The R&D phase consists of two stages, i.e. the contracting stage and the R&D stage. The second phase is the production phase. 1 For the sake of realism, we assume that the IVC (later also the CVC) will exit after the start-up phase.
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1 The R&D phase is often called the seed phase. It includes the development of a business plan, prototypes, research and development, and a contractual arrangement. While the production phase is commonly called the start-up phase, in which production and initial marketing are carried out. (see Tykov ¶ a, 2000).
2 A study done by Black and Gilson (1998) provides evidence that it is indeed the case. After the exit, the entrepreneur very often controls the¯rm, and some other minority shareholders are passive. Furthermore, we assume that vertical merger between the HQ and the venture prior to the production phase is not possible because of an antitrust reason. We will relax this assumption in the extension. 3 The usefulness of IVC can be argued in the following way: the HQ might not want to¯nance the venture since the beginning (but rather acquire it in a later stage from the IVC) if there is a (even small) probability that the project might not be su±ciently Input B is a standard input which is produced in a competitive market, i.e. there are many producers of it. While input A may be potentially superior substitute of input B, it is only produced by a monopolist (the HQ).
We assume here that input A producer and input B producers already serve other clients in the existing market, thus even if they do not sell the input to the venture they can still operate in the market. The venture is potentially a new big client. The existing market that the HQ serves and the new market related to the HQ's line-of-business. He therefore will want to wait until this probability is resolved before using own corporate¯nancing.
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in which the venture operates are assumed to be segmented. This implies that the HQ is able to price discriminate between the two markets. Later in Section 7 we relax this.
Input A is potentially superior in the sense that if this input is used in the production of the¯nal good by the venture and provided that the venture exerts a su±cient additional R&D e®ort 4 above the R&D e®ort that is already exerted (recall that it was normalized to zero) to ensure complementarity, then there are complementary bene¯ts accrued to the venture in the form of reduction in own marginal costs (in what follows it will be denoted by°¸0). If R&D e®ort is not exerted, then using input A will imply higher marginal costs of producing the¯nal good for the venture than using the standard input (input B). This is motivated by the idea that input A is a newly innovative input that is not yet widely used in the industry, and thus to get the bene¯ts of using it, some adjustements (which requires e®ort by the entrepreneur) has to be exerted in order to guarantee su±cient complementarity.
For simplicity, we assume that one unit of input is needed to produce one unit of the¯nal good. We denote ® A as the proportion of shares obtained 
The payo®s of the venture, if the venture uses input A and no e®ort is exerted is expression (1) with°= 0: The payo®s of the venture, if the venture uses input B:
The per unit price of input B is w B . The marginal costs of producing thē nal good using input B is di®erent from using input A and equals to d B . In order to focus our attention on the more interesting part of the analysis, we
Again, the¯nal price for the venture's product
Here the costs for°does not enter the pro¯t function since the venture of course will set°= 0 if it intends to use input B in the production phase.
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The timing of the game is as follows (see also¯gure 2). There are essentially¯ve stages here. In stage 0, a contract between the IVC and the entrepreneur is signed. The funds are disbursed. In stage 1, the optimal e®ort (°) is determined (and exerted by the entrepreneur). In stage 2, the venture passes the R&D phase and the IVC exits. In stage 3, the input prices are determined. Finally, in the last stage the optimal monopoly quantity is set. We solve the game using backward induction. The product market outcome is not determined by the success probability
x. The optimal Q produced using input A can be derived as:
Then we will derive the optimal w A and w B : Note that here we need to compare the net pro¯ts of using input A and using input B. Using input A the pro¯ts are (denoted by ©
Recall that p A = (a ¡ Q A ) and p B = (a ¡ Q B ). Using input B, the pro¯ts
The optimal¯nal good that is produced by the venture using input B can be derived as,
The input producers B will just price their product (the standard product)
as high as its marginal cost (c B ) because there are many producers that produce input B, thus,
Hence, comparing both pro¯ts,
and w B = c B we have the following condition.
This says that pro¯ts accrued from using input A are the same as pro¯ts accrued from using input B if the HQ is behaving opportunistically and incorporates the bene¯ts of R&D in the price of input A. 5 This is the best strategy for the HQ. By setting the price slightly higher, the HQ loses all the demand (which then goes to input B producers). Below that price, it is never optimal provided that the monopoly price (see Tirole, 1988 ) is above that equilibrium price; i.e. whenever
is infact the di®erence in marginal costs of the venture of using input A and input B.
Here we can already explain some potential cases. First, let us denote the marginal costs of the HQ in producing input A by c A . Note that we always have w A¸cA , hence we can substitute w A .
This says that the di®erence in the venture's additional marginal costs must be greater or equal to the di®erence in the upstream¯rms' marginal costs. This is the feasibility condition for the price undercutting strategy of the HQ (Bertrand price competition in order to attract demand). This condition says that the price-undercutting strategy is feasible, and thus the venture will indeed use input A. Note that if the above condition is not satis¯ed, then the price undercutting strategy is not feasible since the HQ make losses (w A < c A ). In this case the venture will utilize input B. Hence, we can state the following Lemma.
enables the HQ to get all demand from input producer B. With this undercutting price strategy the HQ extracts all the complementary bene¯ts In what follows in this section and the next one, we assume
Hence, assumption 1 implies that the RHS of (10) is negative, and thus it means that the HQ can undercut input B producers' price p B even without extending corporate venture¯nancing.
We are now in the second stage. We derive the optimal°¤ by taking the f.o.c. of the following expression w.r.t.°and then solve for°.
As°¤ = 0 then it makes the price-undercutting strategy become more di±cult to be carried out. Note, that since°¤ = 0, there is also a hold-up problem. The venture will not have incentive to exert e®ort. 6 Hence, we can state the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Existence of a Hold-Up Problem) Without corporate venture¯-nancing, there is a hold-up problem (°¤ = 0). Thus, we have w
), which clearly shows that the HQ losses its°exibility in implementing the price-undercutting strategy as w A > w ¤ A .
Notice that if the HQ does not have an incentive to undercut more, then corporate venture¯nancing is very attractive as it will increase°¤ > 0; which implies the HQ's pro¯ts increase because of the demand shift. Also corporate venture¯nancing is used to solve the hold-up problem. This will be discussed in the next section.
In stage 1, we derive the optimal equity contracts. It is the pro¯t of the independent venture capitalist that will just make its participation constraint binding.
so that
The equity contract should exactly compensate the IVC for the funds I invested. Hence, innovation pro¯ts of the venture can be expressed as
Payo®s of the headquarter from selling input A to the venture are,
The entrepreneur's and IVC's pro¯ts are,
is not satis¯ed, the HQ has no incentive to use the undercutting strategy and therefore the venture buys its input from input B producers.
The Model with Corporate Venture Financing
In this section we consider the case in which the HQ¯nances the venture through the corporate venture capital (CVC). This setting in which the HQ deals through an intermediary can be motivated by several reasons. Firstly, it may be better to use an intermediary in order to gain trust from the venture that the HQ will not steal the idea. Second, the HQ may need a middleman who has the expertise to look a potential project, and this middleman is the CVC. As the HQ may not have the expertise and lack of monitoring ability then the use of an intermediary is preferable. Thirdly, it may also because the HQ wants to focus and specialize on running the existing business, and therefore prefers to subcontract the venture¯nancing through a subsidiary (the CVC) and for looking for new product ideas on the market.
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The di®erence between Corporate Venture¯nancing and Independent
Venture lies on the fact that the CVC will impose the R&D e®ort that the venture will have to spend and the venture has no°exibility anymore. 8 We assume here that the CVC also incurs some exogeneous¯xed costs ¾ > 0 for ensuring that once the venture exerts e®ort the complementary bene¯ts can be accrued. In this sense, our model assumes that the amount of complementary bene¯ts can be observed with some costs, and a contract can be written based on the level of R&D e®ort that the venture will have to exert. Thus, inherently we assume that monitoring is fully e®ective and enables the CVC to observe whether or not the entrepreneur has exerted the right e®ort. Ob-viously, it is possible to relax this assumption and to consider a more explicit contracting model. We leave this issue for further research and concentrating our discussion on the product market aspect of corporate venture¯nancing rather than on the contracting aspect.
The timing structure is still more or less the same as before (see¯gure 3). The only di®erence now is that the CVC instead of the IVC is the one who plays a dominant role. k°2 can be derived as,
The optimal¯nal good production is,
The optimal w A and w B are still the same as in the benchmark case.
With¯nancing, the HQ imposes the optimal°, which is derived from the following optimization
, and subject to the entrepreneur's participation constraint, which is
In equilibrium, this inequality should be binding and ® A will be the solution of this equality.
Notice that b ¦ v represents the outside option (PC) of the venture, which is the case without corporate venture¯nancing and therefore from our benchmark case we know that°¤ = 0 (due to the hold-up problem), and ¾ represents the coordination or suplementary advice costs of the CVC.
Note that Q is independent of°in this case because the monopoly price of the HQ is greater than c B ; therefore the HQ's pricing strategy results from the undercutting equilibrium with respect to the outside option of the venture (which is the price of input B). If c B ¡ c A is moderate, then the monopoly price of the HQ will always be higher than c B : Then, taking the f.o.c. of the above pro¯t function w.r.t.°, we obtain the¯rst-best (we put the entrepreneur to his reservation value b ¦ v and compensate his e®ort).°¤
Given the undercutting pricing strategy of the HQ,°is independent of the sharing rule between the venture and HQ for the venture's pro¯t. This stems from the fact that the HQ will extract all the bene¯ts from complementarity in innovation (°> 0) and make the bene¯ts only from the input supply to the venture.
In stage 1, we solve for the equity shares provided that there is a contract signed:
The di®erence in shares exactly compensates the entrepreneur for the e®ort he is exerting. This decreases as k gets larger since it negatively a®ects°.
Finally, we compare the HQ's pro¯ts with and without corporate¯nancing
to determine under what condition is corporate venture¯nancing pro¯table.
The result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Financing through a CVC is optimal if ¾ <
This leads to a positive°: The attractiveness of corporate venture¯nancing increases if;
(i) The market size (a) is larger.
(ii) The supplementary (coordination) costs of the corporate venture capital (¾) are smaller.
(iii) The e±ciency of the entrepreneur's e®ort is higher (smaller k).
(iv) The marginal costs of the competitors (c B ) are lower.
(v) The probability of success (x) increases.
Proof : See appendix.
The above proposition o®ers some testable implications. Intuitively, the result says that the corporate group (HQ) faces the following trade-o®: either be more aggressive ex post in the product market (by undercutting more its rivals) or use corporate venture¯nancing to a®ect the venture's product innovation outcome to weaken competition with substitute products. 
The Case of Securing Demand
In this section we relax assumption 1. Thus, we consider the case of (c B ¡ c A ) <
, which implies that°> 0. This means that price-undercutting strategy without corporate venture¯nancing becomes infeasible, i.e. the HQ may obtain positive demand only if the HQ¯nances the venture. As we have analyzed previously, by providing a venture¯nancing through the CVC, the HQ can impose the optimal value of°:
There are two di®erent cases here, namely, (1)
and (2)
In which°¤ indicates the optimal value of°(calculated as in the previous section).
In case 1, in order to enable price undercutting strategy, the HQ has to
10 This°m in represents the least value of°that still enables the HQ to undercut its competitor. Its value is higher than°¤. Imposing such a sub-optimal°implies pro¯ts losses (denote pro¯ts by e ¦ f hq ). It remains to check whether or not it may still be optimal to extend venture¯nancing. In the second case, the HQ will impose°¤. However, there is a threshold value of°¤ that will make venture¯nancing feasible. It is easy to see that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2
(i) If case 1 prevails, corporate venture¯nancing is not pro¯table. Furthermore, because the HQ has no ability to undercut, it will not serve the new market.
(ii) If case 2 prevails, the pro¯tability of corporate venture¯nancing will depend on the value of°¤ that is to be imposed. Corporate venture¯nancing will be extended i®°¤¸°¤, in which°¤ is the threshold value of°; above 10 See expression (10) .
which the HQ can still make su±cient pro¯ts to compensate for monitoring (¾) and e®ort ¡ 1 2 k°2 ¢ costs. The venture¯nancing will enable the HQ to secure demand. Otherwise if°¤ <°¤, then the HQ will not supply the venture.
Summary of the Results
From the analysis so far, we have shown that the HQ faces a trade-o® between, on the one hand, being more aggressive ex-post in the product market by undercutting its rivals' price, and, on the other hand, using the CVC to a®ect the venture's product innovation outcome in order to weaken compe- represents relative cost disadvantage for the venture from using the specialized input A when°= 0 (note that by assumption d A > d B ). Obviously, in order to provide incentive for the venture to use the specialized input A, the HQ has to ensure that the bene¯ts for the venture exceed the costs. This in turn depends on the magnitude of (c B ¡ c A ) and complementarity°.
1. c A < c B (the HQ has a cost advantage vis-a-vis its rivals) and Assumption 1 is satis¯ed. In this case, the HQ does not need to provide venture¯nancing to the venture. Price undercutting alone is su±cient to enable the HQ to get the demand. Proposition 1 determines when CVC is used.
2. c A < c B (the HQ has a cost advantage vis-a-vis its rivals) but Assumption 1 is not satis¯ed. In this case, it will be better for the HQ to provide venture¯nancing to the venture. By giving venture¯nanc-ing, the venture's product innovation outcome is altered in such a way that the costs of the venture from using the specialized input A will be lowered by the amount of complementary bene¯ts°: Thus, the costs will be (d A ¡ d B ¡°), which clearly shows that the°exibility of price undercutting strategy is enhanced.
3. c A > c B (the HQ has a small cost dis-advantage vis-a-vis its rivals) and°¤¸°¤ . In this case, giving a venture¯nancing is a must. It enables the HQ to secure demand, which would have been impossible to do, had the HQ not extended venture¯nancing.
c A >> c B (the HQ has a huge cost dis-advantage vis-a-vis its rivals)
and°¤ <°¤. In this case, the HQ will not be active in the new market, in which the venture operates.
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In this Section, we brie°y discuss how participation of corporate venture capitalists happen in practice, and present a few additional examples to the ones already mentioned in the Introduction.
In fact, a corporate venture capitalist 11 can enter shareholdership in a venture, either by re¯nancing it (i.e., by buying the shares of the former IVC) or by syndicating next¯nancing rounds. In the latter case, the IVC remains as a shareholder in the venture but does not¯nance the next round in full anymore; the rest can be provided by new shareholders, like corporate venture capitalists. For the CVC with strategic¯t to the fund provider (the HQ), it then represents a strategic investment for the HQ (a \spin-in", in contrast to spin-o®s). Re¯nancing is quite rare in Europe but syndication is much more important. For 2000, re¯nancing to another venture capitalist occured in 11.6% of amount divested, and to¯nancial institutions in only 3.9% (EVCA (2001)). Syndication appeared in 28% of amount divested (the 11 Gompers and Lerner (1998) distinguish between two di®erent types of corporate venture capitalists: one with and one without strategic¯t. We focus on the¯rst one, in which the corporate venture capitalist¯nances start-up companies that eventually come up with a product that is in line with the HQ's businesses. Notice although that this does not mean that the CVC is a \servant" of the HQ. The CVC simply is a venture capitalist whose funds are solely provided by a single source (the HQ) but his ob jective still is to make money for himself. The particularity of a CVC with strategic¯t is that the HQ imposes constraints on the CVC on the types of ventures to¯nance. Furthermore, this remaining independence from the HQ is required; if the HQ were able to change the status of his agreement with the CVC (or to collude with the CVC to hold-up the ventures), then no entrepreneur would be willing to approach such a CVC. The fact that syndication also involves ICVs with the only aim to maximize expected pro¯ts further weakens the opportunistic behavior of HQs (the only problem that may occur is when°also implies a negative externality in the venture's use of alternative inputs, like for input B producers; this would create a dependence of the venture on the HQ and thus the entrepreneur would need to be compensated with additional shares).
5-year average is 30%, which shows that 2000 was not an exceptional year).
In case of syndication, the involvement of the CVC can also be viewed in some way as being a joint venture between the entrepreneur and the HQ.
It is di±cult to assess the relative importance of each exit route for CVCs, but a trade sale to the HQ is certainly not the only way. Evidence is pro- 
Extensions

The Impact of the HQ's Existing Market
Until now, we have assumed either that the HQ was only providing input A to the new venture (creation of a new market for the HQ) or that the new 26 demand generated by the venture's innovation was totally separate from the other demand for input A (market segmentation). In both cases, the HQ was able to set the price w A for the venture monopolistically and independently from any other demand for this same input. In this section, we show that taking into account for the fact that other¯rms also buy input A (but for another use) may a®ect the decision of the HQ to undercut or not (and thus to use corporate venture¯nancing or not). Though, the major results on the use of corporate venture¯nancing remain qualitatively unchanged after slight modi¯cations.
A simple way to illustrate this is to de¯ne the total demand of all other buyers by q and to assume it to be perfectly inelastic to price up to some price w (this is to say that we only consider the price e®ect but not the volume e®ect in the analysis). Thus, for pure sake of simplicity, let us assume q¯x and independent of the wholesale price w A .
The adjusted maximization problem is now the following: 
Thus, corporate venture¯nancing is pro¯table whenever the diference between the gain from employing it (x°(Q ¤ A + q)) and its costs (
overweights monitoring costs (¾). This di®erence equals
which increases with q, the size of the existing market. Notice that we still need to check whether it is pro¯table for the HQ to serve this new market by lowering the wholesale price w A ; i.e., his outside option is (w ¡ c A ) q. This was assumed to be the case by assumption. Thus, this positive relationship between q and the likelihood for corporate venture¯nancing stems from the fact that the new market is served anyway so that the use of corporate venture¯nancing allows to weaken the ex-post competition on the product market (and therefore to increase the price-cost margin).
If the outside option is not to serve the market in case corporate venturē nancing is not used, the picture looks di®erent. This means that ¦ This is the case i®
When di®erentiating on both sides with respect to q, we get that corporate venture¯nancing is increasingly pro¯table as q increases (since then the di®erence between ¦ f hq and (w ¡ c A ) q is getting larger) i® x°¤ ¤ (q; :::) > w ¡ c A so that the use of corporate venture¯nancing is more likely for high q. This is always the case. If this were not the case, using corporate venture¯nancing to insure additional demand from the venture is not pro¯table; i.e. ¦ f hq < (w ¡ c A ) q. Its likelihood decreases with the level of w.
We can therefore state the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The optimal degree of complementarity°¤ ¤ is an increasing function of the size of the HQ's existing market q. Also, the greater q, the more likely the use of corporate venture¯nancing by the headquarter.
The intuitions are straigthforward. In the¯rst case, the HQ has the incentive to impose a higher°if q is more important since it weakens ex post competition and therefore allows the HQ to keep the price w A still rather high. The greater q, the more important this e®ect on own pro¯t ¦ hq . The second implication goes along the same line, since again the need to weaken ex post competition (in order to avoid decreasing price w A too much) increases with q, making the use of corporate venture¯nancing more valuable.
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The Case of Vertical Merger
In this sub-section, we analyse the case of vertical merger, in which the HQ acquires the venture, rather than letting the venture to become an independent¯nal good producer. We assume that the merger takes place after the CVC exits. There will just be an internal transfer of shares from the CVC to the HQ. 13 .
It should be noted here that, by merging, the HQ will automatically be able to enforce the use of input A by the venture without having to undercut its competitor. The price charged for input A will be equal to marginal costs of producing input A. Thus, the HQ subsidizes the venture in order to extract higher monopoly pro¯ts of the venture.
The optimal°can be derived from the following optimization, 
It can then be shown that the following proposition holds. 13 We assume away incentive problems faced by the HQ in this transfer of shares.
Proposition 4 Given that the HQ extends corporate venture¯nancing to the venture, then HQ's can enjoy even larger pro¯ts by merging with the venture.
We should bear in mind that it is assumed here that a merger entails no costs. Once we introduce costs of merger, the result might change. A merger may not be feasible anymore depending on the magnitude of merger costs. Nevertheless, the analysis points to an interesting implication namely that, whenever a vertical merger is possible at no costs the exit route that the CVC (the HQ) would choose is acquisition. But as already discussed in Section 6, mergers are not the unique exit route for CVCs.
Notice although that the trade-o® presented in Section 3 still holds (with slight modi¯cation) even if a merger is allowed. Under merger, the quantities produced with and without corporate venture¯nancing are: 
Therefore, the di®erence in expected pro¯ts is
and thus the trade-o® for the use of corporate venture funding now is
i.e., the di®erence in expected pro¯ts must compensate the additional costs from using corporate venture capital (the monitoring costs ¾ and the entrepreneur's compensation for his additional e®ort). This means that the trade-o® does not vanish if merging is allowed.
The Case of Indirect Securing of Demand
Until now, the demand generated for the HQ by the venture's innovative product has always been \direct"; i.e. the HQ's product has directly been In what follows, we will label such a demand e®ect as \indirect". This type of demand creation is considered here.
The HQ or his competitors get additional demand µQ i , with i 2 fA; Bg.
The HQ therefore again has an interest in the successful R&D outcome of the The venture faces demand as before; input price is¯xed w (e.g., either because this input is supplied by many¯rms so that they face perfect competition or that the demand of the venture is too small to a®ect the price) and provided by another¯rm than the HQ. Thus, the value of the venture in case of successful innovation is Notice that the entrepreneur's outside option is worth
while the HQ's possible expected pro¯ts are
We only solve for the case of no merger; i.e., the entrepreneur chooses the price of his product non-cooperatively from the HQ. The amount of shares (1 ¡ ® 0 ) must compensate the entrepreneur for his outside option and for his e®ort excerted 1 2 k± 2 (again, for simplicity, we assume ± to be contractible { or alternatively, that monitoring is fully e®ective if the CVC excerts e®ort ¾).
Corporate venture¯nancing will therefore be used by the HQ whenever the costs of monitoring ¾ and for compensating the entrepreneur for his additional e®ort is less than the gain (i.e. the possibility either to undercut and thus to secure demand or simply to weaken competition (this is the case when demand can be secured through undercutting even without the use of corporate venture¯nancing, like in Section 3)). We can then derive the following proposition.
Proposition 5 When the demand e®ect is \indirect", it may still be profitable for a headquarter to use corporate venture¯nancing for securing own demand if c A > c B and
Furthermore, the optimal level of complementarity ± ¤ is increasing in the demand generated by the innovative venture (µQ A ).
Notice although that the hold-up e®ect (Lemma 1) through price undercutting in the product market stage vanishes (but only in this simpli¯ed version where the price of the HQ's product does not a®ect the venture's demand).
Conclusion
There are several reasons why a¯rm may establish a corporate venture¯-nancing subsidiary (see Gompers and Lerner (1998) ). One of these reasons, which is quite often cited in the popular business news is the desire of big corporations to get an opportunity to sell their own product, and thus securing demand for the¯rm. In this paper, we provide a formalization of this kind of reasoning.
The decision to use corporate venture¯nancing allows the¯rm to in°u-ence the degree of complementarity between its product (used by the venture as an input) and the¯nal product of the venture. This allows the HQ to \steal" demand from other companies when the HQ's product can be substituted by other products. We show that in the absence of corporate venture ¯nancing there can be a hold-up problem. We also show that the (either direct or indirect) securing demand e®ect is made possible because corporate venture¯nancing enhances the°exibility of a price undercutting strategy in the product market. The¯rm will not have to undercut its competitor too much. At the extreme case, in which the¯rm is not able to do priceundercutting strategy, the corporate venture¯nancing will enable the¯rm to \steal" demand from its competitors. In this paper, we also derive some testable empirical implications as well.
Last but not least, our framework can be embedded into the literature on network economics, in particular on the issue of competing platforms.
It is frequently mentioned in this literature, that an operating system producer often encourages software developers to create new applications using the operating system as a platform, and thus enhancing the value of the operating system in the market. By doing this, the producer can create a stronger base for its operating system in the market. 14 In many cases, the operating system producer can accomplish this goal by providing software building blocks that lower the costs of developing complementary software applications. Cusumano and Yo±e (1998), for instance, mention that as of 1995 Microsoft spent about 65 million dollars annually supporting independent software developers and had about 400 technical support engineers who exclusively served independent developers. In our framework, this assistance in term of the provision of software buiding blocks, is substituted with ā nancial assistance that will enable the independent developers to innovate in such a way that lowers the costs of developing complementary software applications. Integrating these two aspects in one framework and deriving conditions under which a particular approach is more optimal would be an interesting area for future research.
APPENDIX Proof to Proposition 1
The HQ's pro¯ts without corporate¯nancing:
and with corporate¯nancing, Because of the price undercutting strategy, the monitoring cost ¾ and the e®ort costs is paid from the upstream pro¯ts (supply of input to the venture). The venture pro¯t just compensates for the investment costs I and the outside option of the entrepreneur.
We can then derive the threshold value of ¾ for corporate¯nancing,
More generally, the condition is: ¾ < x°¤Q which is clearly negative. This means that imposing°m in results in negative pro¯ts. It enables the HQ to undercut its competitor, however the pro¯ts accrued are not su±cient to compensate for the monitoring and e®ort costs. By de¯nition, imposing°¤ <°m in , will not enable the HQ to do price undercutting. Thus, it should be that°¤ >°m in . It is then obvious to see that whenever case 1 prevails, corporate venture¯nancing is not pro¯table. Furthermore, because the HQ has no ability to undercut, it will not serve the new market. In case 2, the pro¯tability of corporate venture¯nancing will depend on the value of°¤ that is to be imposed. It should at least compensate monitoring and e®ort costs that are incurred by the HQ ³ e ¦ f hq = 0´. Let us de¯ne°¤ as the value of°; such that e ¦ f hq = 0. It is straightforward to see that venture¯nancing is feasible if°¤ >°¤. It enables the HQ to secure demand, which would have been impossible to do, had the HQ not extended venture¯nancing.¥
Proof to Proposition 4
The pro¯ts of the HQ from giving venture¯nancing and merging with the venture are,
Comparing with,
Since°m is the optimal value of°in case of merger, we know that ¦ , we can derive the following expression,
